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1502 
Article 
Preemption and Civic Democracy in the 
Battle over Wal-Mart 
Catherine L. Fisk & Michael M. Oswalt† 
Where Wal-Mart goes, debate over the labor practices of 
the world’s largest retailer seems inevitably to follow. While the 
company’s expansion plans sometimes succeed and sometimes 
fail, the setting for these disputes rarely changes; the battle 
over Wal-Mart is fought primarily at the state and local levels.1 
This battle pits activists committed to a “producerist” vision for 
the economy where workers are paid well, treated with respect, 
and have access to affordable health care2 against Wal-Mart’s 
“consumerist” economic vision where low prices are the ulti-
mate measure of societal well-being.3  
The important debate over these two competing visions of 
social and economic welfare can occur in a truly democratic way 
only at the local level. There, however, the intensely democratic 
activism and civic dialogue generated by Wal-Mart and its op-
ponents are severely constrained by the legal doctrine of 
 
†  Ms. Fisk is the Douglas Blount Maggs Professor of Law at Duke Uni-
versity. Mr. Oswalt will receive a J.D. and an M.T.S. from Duke University in 
2008. They gratefully acknowledge financial support for this project from the 
Fuller-Perdue Fund at Duke Law School. Copyright © 2008 by Catherine L. 
Fisk and Michael M. Oswalt. 
 1. See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Lo-
calist Ideology, and the Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920–1940, 
90 IOWA L. REV. 1011, 1090 (2005) (noting that the “battle” over Wal-Mart ex-
pansion must be fought at the local level); Jessica Garrison & Sara Lin, Wal-
Mart vs. Inglewood a Warm-Up for L.A. Fight, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2004, at A1 
(describing local efforts in several California communities to stop development 
of Wal-Mart Supercenters). 
 2. See MICHAEL KAZIN, THE POPULIST PERSUASION 56, 162–63 (1995) 
(describing the producerist ethic as “labor creates all wealth” and that “power 
should be wielded at least as much by those who create wealth as by those 
who possess it”). 
 3. See Schragger, supra note 1, at 1089 (“Wal-Mart is representative of 
an economy that has become obsessed with price competition to the detriment 
of other values.”). 
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preemption, which holds that the existence of a federal law on a 
topic can block state and local authorities from enacting laws 
on the same topic.4 A federal court ruling that state or local law 
is preempted not only takes away the power of state and local 
government to address an issue, it takes away the power of 
grassroots organizers to engage in democracy’s most fundamen-
tal behavior: to debate whether and how law should address a 
social problem and to see organizing efforts made into law. Al-
though much has been written about federal preemption of 
state and local law, almost no attention has been paid to the ef-
fect of preemption on political and civic engagement.  
In the pages that follow, we begin by explaining the impor-
tance of local activism against the backdrop of the failure of 
federal law to constrain Wal-Mart’s efforts to lower costs by 
paying inadequate wages and benefits and to thwart unioniza-
tion by both legal and illegal tactics. Local activists pursue two 
common strategies to regulate Wal-Mart: fair-share health care 
legislation5 and zoning to exclude large low-wage retailers from 
a local market.6 Showing how preemption either derails local 
organizing (by invalidating fair-share laws) or deforms it (by 
forcing fights over working conditions into the alien territory of 
land-use law), we argue against excessively broad interpreta-
tion of the preemptive scope of federal law, particularly the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).7 
For reasons we will explain, ERISA does not preempt local 
democratic initiatives, such as those recently attempted in 
Maryland.8 These initiatives force companies that do not pro-
vide adequate wages or health benefits to pay a tax to offset the 
cost to taxpayers of providing health care and basic social wel-
 
 4. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the 
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the su-
preme Law of the Land . . . .”); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 
327 (1819) (“The laws of the United States, then, made in pursuance of the 
constitution, are to be the supreme law of the land . . . .”). 
 5. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Maryland’s “Wal-Mart” Act: Policy and 
Preemption, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 847, 848–50 (2006) (discussing Maryland’s 
“Fair Share” law that attempts to force for-profit employers with more than 
10,000 employees to help pay for employee health care). 
 6. See Garrison & Lin, supra note 1 (explaining the efforts of some Cali-
fornia city governments to enact zoning rules designed to keep Wal-Mart out). 
 7. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified in scattered sections 
of 29 U.S.C.). 
 8. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8.5-101 to -107 (LexisNexis 1999 & 
Supp. 2007), invalidated by Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 
180 (4th Cir. 2007). 
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fare protections to the working poor. We show that the recent 
split decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit, in Retail Industry Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 
which found ERISA to preempt the Maryland Fair Share 
Health Act, was based on an erroneous reading of the Supreme 
Court’s leading ERISA cases.9 Moving beyond the technical ar-
guments about the scope of ERISA preemption, we argue—
based on an extensive literature on theories of organizing and 
civic democracy—that courts should narrowly construe the 
scope of federal preemption in the field of low-wage work and 
affordable health care. We thus bring to the law of preemption 
a new focus on the extraordinary importance in a democracy of 
local activism, organizing, and debate over social welfare. In 
sum, we contend that activists are right to persist in fighting 
for local democratic initiatives like the Maryland Fair Share 
Law even in the face of broad federal preemption, and lawyers 
for progressive local movements can properly find a space with-
in ERISA preemption doctrine to defend the validity of these 
local initiatives. 
I.  THE INADEQUACY OF FEDERAL REGULATION OF 
WAL-MART AND THE PROBLEM OF PREEMPTION OF 
STATE AND LOCAL LAW   
Wal-Mart has become the poster child for all that is wrong 
with an economy that generates a huge array of cheap consum-
er goods while sacrificing decent wages and adequate social 
welfare protections such as health care and retirement savings. 
Although a wide range of federal laws regulate working condi-
tions, none has proved adequate to the task of constraining 
Wal-Mart’s push to pay its employees as little as possible and 
to work them as hard as possible. 
To begin, U.S. labor law has been incapable of checking the 
company’s virulent antiunionism.10 In the absence of unions or 
effective enforcement of protective labor legislation, reports of 
 
 9. 475 F.3d at 197. 
 10. Wade Rathke, A Wal-Mart Workers Association? An Organizing Plan, 
in WAL-MART: THE FACE OF TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALISM 261, 268–69 
(Nelson Lichtenstein ed., 2006). Not a single Wal-Mart store or department 
has unionized, or at least has done so without the company firing workers and 
closing the department (as in the case of the one group of Texas Wal-Mart em-
ployees who unionized and promptly lost their jobs), or the entire store (as in 
the case of Canadian Wal-Marts that were successfully organized and then 
promptly closed). Id. 
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wage and hour violations abound,11 as do assertions of exploita-
tion of undocumented workers.12 Moreover, Wal-Mart is the de-
fendant in the largest class action lawsuit ever brought under 
Title VII; allegations of endemic and widespread sex discrimi-
nation in pay and promotions were found sufficient to warrant 
certification of a class.13 In addition, the explosive growth of 
Wal-Mart’s low-cost retailing model has had a devastating im-
pact on small downtown commerce. The model has dramatical-
ly changed the nature of shopping, the prospects of small retail 
businesses, and the competitive position of unionized or higher-
wage retailers.14 In all, the phenomenal growth of Wal-Mart’s 
business model is a threat to an alternative retail business 
model in which consumer goods may cost more, but workers are 
also paid better and have more control over their working con-
ditions.  
The problem is not merely underenforcement of existing 
laws. Some of Wal-Mart’s aggressive labor-cost controlling 
measures are legal under federal and state law. Recently, the 
retail giant has drastically restructured its labor practices by 
capping wages, using more part-time workers, scheduling work 
on nights and weekends, and demanding that workers be 
available around the clock every day of the year. Wal-Mart, 
 
 11. See, e.g., Abigail Goldman & Nancy Cleeland, An Empire Built on 
Bargains Remakes the Working World, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, at A1 (de-
scribing how Wal-Mart’s actions influence wages and working conditions 
world-wide); Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart Settles U.S. Suit About Overtime, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2007, at C7 (reporting Wal-Mart’s agreement to pay $33.5 
million to settle a U.S. Department of Labor lawsuit); Steven Greenhouse, 
Wal-Mart Told to Pay $78 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2006, at C4 (reporting 
a $78 million jury verdict in a class action case challenging a policy of requir-
ing workers to work through rest breaks); Stacey Stowe, Connecticut Finds 
More Labor Law Violations at Wal-Mart, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2005, at B2 
(noting that Connecticut investigators fined Wal-Mart for violating child labor 
laws at three stores). 
 12. Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart Suit Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 
2006, at A17 (describing a suit alleging Wal-Mart had conspired with cleaning 
contractors to abuse immigrant janitors). 
 13. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 474 F.3d 1214, 1222–23 (9th Cir. 2007). The story 
behind the Dukes case is told in LIZA FEATHERSTONE, SELLING WOMEN SHORT: 
THE LANDMARK BATTLE FOR WORKERS’ RIGHTS AT WAL-MART (2004), and in 
Brad Seligman, Patriarchy at the Checkout Counter: The Dukes v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. Class-Action Suit, in WAL-MART: THE FACE OF TWENTY-FIRST-
CENTURY CAPITALISM, supra note 10, at 231, 231–42. 
 14. See generally Katharine B. Silbaugh, Wal-Mart’s Other Woman Prob-
lem: Sprawl and Work-Family Balance, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1713, 1713–14 
(2007) (explaining the effect of Wal-Mart’s low-cost model on small-town re-
tailers that charge slightly higher prices in exchange for added convenience). 
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however, pays its workers only for hours actually worked.15 An 
internal corporate memo from the company’s executive vice 
president in charge of human resources suggested that manag-
ers encourage long-time employees to quit because “the cost of 
an associate with 7 years of tenure is almost 55 percent more 
than the cost of an associate with 1 year of tenure, yet there is 
no difference in his or her productivity.”16  
Nor does federal law provide a barrier to Wal-Mart offering 
low wages and paltry health benefits, even when it leads large 
numbers of its workers to rely on various forms of publicly 
funded social welfare programs.17 A 2005 internal memo to the 
Wal-Mart Board of Directors, prepared by Wal-Mart’s senior 
executive in charge of human resources, showed that almost 
half of Wal-Mart employees’ children were either uninsured or 
receiving Medicaid. Further, nearly forty percent of Wal-Mart 
employees spent an average of sixteen percent or more of their 
pay on health care, which is about four times the national av-
erage.18 The memo suggested that the company’s health care 
costs could be contained by restructuring jobs to require more 
physical activity. This recharacterization would dissuade un-
healthy people from working for Wal-Mart and would encour-
age the use of more part-time workers who would not be eligi-
ble for or could not afford the health insurance plan that the 
company provides.19 These policies and practices are largely 
beyond the effective power of federal law. 
 
 15. Steven Greenhouse & Michael Barbaro, Wal-Mart to Add More Part-
Timers and Wage Caps, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2006, at A1.  
 16. Id. 
 17. See generally ARINDRAJIT DUBE & KEN JACOBS, HIDDEN COST OF 
WAL-MART JOBS: USE OF SAFETY NET PROGRAMS BY WAL-MART WORKERS IN 
CALIFORNIA 1 (U.C. Berkeley Center for Labor Research and Education, Aug. 
2, 2004), available at http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/retail/walmart.pdf (find-
ing that families of Wal-Mart employees use approximately forty percent more 
in taxpayer-funded health care than the average for families of all large retail 
employees and thirty-eight percent more in other non-health-care public assis-
tance programs, such as food stamps, Earned Income Tax Credit, subsidized 
school lunches, and subsidized housing); Joshua Green, The New War Over 
Wal-Mart, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 2006, at 38, 41–42. 
 18. Reed Abelson, Everyday High Health Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2005, 
at C1. 
 19. Id.; see also Pallavi Gogoi & Robert Berner, Wal-Mart Puts on a Happy 
Face, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Apr. 19, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/investor/ 
content/apr2006/pi20060419_152855.htm (describing new company health 
benefit plans with expanded coverage for part-time employees but noting that 
many plans would be unaffordable for Wal-Mart employees). 
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Moreover, the strategies that would enable worker advo-
cates to challenge Wal-Mart’s labor practices most directly are 
largely foreclosed by inadequate federal protection of the right 
to unionize.20 Workers could combat Wal-Mart’s low wages and 
inadequate benefits head-on by unionizing and bargaining for 
better conditions. Federal labor law, unfortunately, gives em-
ployers a wide array of tools to fight workplace organizing. Em-
ployers enjoy federally protected rights to refuse to recognize a 
union that enjoys the majority support of its workers, to run a 
lengthy and intimidating antiunion campaign, to illegally fire 
union supporters without facing meaningful penalties, to per-
manently replace striking workers, and to close down any oper-
ation that unionizes.21 It is well known that Wal-Mart has 
made the most of the power it enjoys under federal law—the 
company employs an entire staff of antiunion experts whom it 
dispatches to quell any sign of unionization.22 
The patent shortcomings of federal labor law are accompa-
nied by the lack of any federal mandate requiring employers to 
offer health or pension benefits to its employees. ERISA, the 
federal law that regulates pensions and health benefits, does 
not require employers to provide benefits; it merely imposes 
some limits on the design and administration of the benefits 
plans the employer voluntarily provides.23 Thus, federal law 
provides no assistance to workers at Wal-Mart and other low-
 
 20. Federal preemption compounds the problem by preventing localities 
and states from enacting laws intended to facilitate unionization. See Michael 
H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Preemption: State Laws Facilitating Unioni-
zation, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355, 364–66, 394–96 (1990) (discussing the short-
comings of the National Labor Relations Act and arguing that the preemption 
doctrine should not prevent states from passing labor laws outside the “conti-
nuum” of federal regulations). 
 21. Id. at 362–74. 
 22. Rathke, supra note 10, at 269–70. In a discussion of Wal-Mart’s union-
busting tactics, Rathke writes that  
[t]oday, Wal-Mart maintains a staff of [200] in its labor relations de-
partment, many available to fly to any store when the UPI—Union 
Prevention Index—hits a prescribed set of bells. . . . Of course, when a 
real unionization effort is detected, Bentonville springs into action 
with all necessary resources. For example, in February 2005, when 
eighteen tire-and-lube-shop workers in a Loveland, Colorado, Wal-
Mart prepared for an NLRB election, headquarters flew in a team of 
labor relations experts who hammered away at the luckless young 
workers for more than a week. . . . Not unexpectedly, the union lost, 
17–1. 
Id. 
 23. 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (2000 & Supp. V 2002). 
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wage companies who wish to challenge their working condi-
tions.  
Despite this inadequate federal regulatory framework, 
Wal-Mart nevertheless still confronts a serious challenge to its 
policies: local activism.24 Websites, books, films, and formal coa-
litions have emerged to aid and foment community-level anti-
Wal-Mart efforts.25 Such activism is not necessarily special; to 
varying degrees, organizing that is responsive to a variety of lo-
cal issues, not just an encroaching Wal-Mart, persists through-
out the American landscape.26 But Wal-Mart’s place in the con-
text of local organizing may be unique. As the “template 
business”27 for the twenty-first century American economy,28 
the company symbolizes a triumph of consumerist values,29 
where “everyday low prices”30 are said to create wealth and 
 
 24. See Andy Serwer, Bruised in Bentonville, FORTUNE, Apr. 18, 2005, at 
84, 84 (“From Chicago to New Orleans to California to New York (never mind 
Quebec and Mexico), news that Wal-Mart is coming to town is now often 
greeted with protests.”). 
 25. See, e.g., DAVID PORTER & CHESTER L. MIRSKY, MEGAMALL ON THE 
HUDSON: PLANNING, WAL-MART, AND GRASSROOTS RESISTANCE (2003) (provid-
ing a first-person, meticulously detailed account of an anti-Wal-Mart cam-
paign to help other local activists in similar efforts); Brave New Films, Wal-
Mart: The High Cost of Low Prices, http://www.walmartmovie.com/about.php 
(last visited Apr. 18, 2008) (describing a film that documents communities 
struggling against Wal-Mart); Wake-Up Wal-Mart: Community Fights, http:// 
wakeupwalmart.com/community (last visited Apr. 18, 2008) (listing “5 Steps to 
Keep Your Community ‘Wal-Mart Free’”). 
 26. See generally MICHAEL GECAN, GOING PUBLIC (Anchor 2004) (2002) 
(describing various and successful community change initiatives); ROBERT D. 
PUTNAM & LEWIS M. FELDSTEIN, BETTER TOGETHER (2003) (depicting and 
analyzing a variety of communities and institutions around the country where 
civic activism thrives).  
 27. Nelson Lichtenstein, Wal-Mart: A Template for Twenty-First-Century 
Capitalism, in WAL-MART: THE FACE OF TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALISM, 
supra note 10, at 3, 4. 
 28. See Editorial, The Wal-Martization of America, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 
2003, at A12 (“This Wal-Martization of the work force, to which other low-cost, 
low-pay stores also contribute, threatens to push many Americans into pover-
ty.”).  
 29. See Schragger, supra note 1, at 1087–91 (calling Wal-Mart the symbol 
of a modern economy focused on providing low-cost consumer goods regardless 
of the effect on local communities). 
 30. Anthony Bianco & Wendy Zellner, Is Wal-Mart Too Powerful?, BUS. 
WK., Oct. 6, 2003, at 100 (“At Wal-Mart, ‘everyday low prices’ is more than a 
slogan; it is the fundamental tenet of a cult masquerading as a company.”); see 
also SAM WALTON WITH JOHN HUEY, SAM WALTON: MADE IN AMERICA 50 
(1992) (“What we were obsessed with was keeping our prices below everybody 
else’s. Our dedication to that idea was total.”). 
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unmatched societal benefits,31 over producerist values,32 where 
workers create wealth and should have the power to possess 
it.33 The difference, laments political philosopher Michael San-
del, is morality: “Instead of asking how to elevate or improve or 
restrain people’s preferences, [consumerism] asks how best—
most fully, or fairly, or efficiently—to satisfy them.”34 The anti-
Wal-Mart movement, however, pushes back. Its rhetoric is 
steeped in producerist critiques of the company’s low wages and 
inadequate benefits.35 Wal-Mart’s prominence in the American 
 
 31. As a Fortune article argued in 2003:  
By systematically wresting “pricing power” from the manufacturer 
and handing it to the consumer, Wal-Mart has begun to generate an 
economy-wide Wal-Mart Effect. Economists now credit the company’s 
Everyday Low Prices with contributing to Everyday Low Inflation 
. . . . A 2002 McKinsey study, moreover, found that more than one-
eighth of U.S. productivity growth between 1995 and 1999 could be 
explained “by only two syllables: Wal-Mart.”  
Jerry Useem, One Nation Under Wal-Mart: How Retailing’s Superpower—and 
Our Biggest Most Admired Company—Is Changing the Rules for Corporate 
America, FORTUNE, Mar. 3, 2003, at 64, 68 (discussing economic studies that 
show Wal-Mart has contributed substantially to low inflation and increased 
productivity). In the article, Warren Buffett states that Wal-Mart has “contri-
buted to the financial well-being of the American public more than any insti-
tution I can think of.” Id. See generally JASON FURMAN, WAL-MART: A PRO-
GRESSIVE SUCCESS STORY 15 (Nov. 28, 2005), http://www.americanprogress 
.org/kf/walmart_progressive.pdf (citing economic data to argue that Wal-Mart 
is a “progressive success story” that has resulted in “huge benefits” for middle- 
and low-income Americans and that the company’s critics are misguided). 
 32. KAZIN, supra note 2, at 56, 162–63 (describing the producerist ethic as 
“labor creates all wealth” and that “power should be wielded at least as much 
by those who create wealth as by those who possess it”). 
 33. Id.; see also Schragger, supra note 1, at 1086–87 (noting the shift be-
tween consumerist and producerist ethics and questioning “[w]hether the na-
tion has made the correct tradeoff between consumer sovereignty and individ-
ual . . . self-sufficiency”). In contrast, through the consumerist lens workers 
gain wealth only tangentially, in the form of lower prices. See Steven Green-
house, Opponents of Wal-Mart to Coordinate Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2005, 
at A20 (“[Wal-Mart CEO Lee] Scott cited studies estimating that Wal-Mart 
saves American consumers $100 billion a year and saves the average family 
$600 a year, ‘[giving] them a raise every time they shop with us.’”). 
 34. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT 225 (1996). 
 35. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 33 (“[An anti-Wal-Mart coalition] 
plan[s] to put forward an association of disenchanted Wal-Mart employees, 
current and former, to complain about what they call poverty-level wages and 
stingy benefits.”); Steven Greenhouse, Unions to Push for Better Pay at Wal-
Mart, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2004, at A16 [hereinafter Greenhouse, Unions] (de-
scribing a massive campaign “intended to pressure Wal-Mart, the world’s 
largest retailer, to improve its wages and benefits”); Wake Up Wal-Mart: Why 
Wal-Mart Must Change, http://www.wakeupwalmart.com/change (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2008) (contrasting Wal-Mart’s low-wage, low-benefit vision for Ameri-
ca with the movement’s living-wage, adequate-benefits vision for America). 
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consciousness,36 the sheer number of ongoing Wal-Mart battles 
(with the associated media attention),37 and the wide variety of 
actors involved in any single fight38 inspire optimism that a 
producerist ethic—and its attendant moral economic lens—
could return. 
Unfortunately, where local activists gather the energy and 
strength required to rectify the failures of federal regulation, 
their efforts can be thwarted by federal preemption of state and 
local laws. Courts have increasingly found that even inade-
quate federal laws preempt state and local laws that may offer 
greater protection to workers. They have concluded that the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) broadly preempts state 
laws regulating union organizing and collective bargaining.39 
Similarly, ERISA preempts state laws that “relate to any em-
ployee benefit plan” covered by ERISA, which means that it 
preempts state and local laws that require employers to provide 
health, retirement, or any other benefit that is administered 
through a “plan.”40 Because most private-sector employers (in-
 
 36. See Michael Barbaro, Is Wal-Mart Too Cheap for Its Own Good?, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 30, 2007, at C1 (noting that “Wal-Mart attracts 138 million shop-
pers a week, a staggering figure unmatched in American retailing” and that 
sixty-seven percent of Americans say the company is their number one desti-
nation for discount shopping). 
 37. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 33; Greenhouse, Unions, supra note 
35. The Website walmartwatch.com cites more than thirty formal organiza-
tions actively seeking to prevent Wal-Mart from entering their communities. 
Wal-Mart Watch: Battle-Mart Site Fights, http://walmartwatch.com/ 
battlemart/pages/site_fights (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). 
 38. Efforts to prevent Wal-Mart from locating in Inglewood, California, for 
instance, involved elected officials, members from two unions, Inglewood citi-
zens, and a wide variety of previously existing faith and secular groups “coa-
lesced around the clear threat of the Wal-Mart initiative” to form the Coalition 
for a Better Inglewood. Scott L. Cummings, Law in the Labor Movement’s 
Challenge to Wal-Mart: A Case Study of the Inglewood Site Fight, 95 CAL. L. 
REV. 1927, 1960 (2007). 
 39. See, e.g., Gottesman, supra note 20, at 355 (observing that “prevailing 
wisdom” states that the NLRA “wholly preempts the states’ ability to adopt 
laws facilitating unionization”). 
 40. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000). A plan covered by ERISA is a “plan, fund 
or program . . . established or maintained by an employer or by an employee 
organization, or by both, to the extent that” the plan provides various benefits 
specified in the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000). For example, prior to the 
enactment of ERISA, Hawaii enacted legislation requiring certain employers 
to provide health benefits to employees. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 393-1 to -51 
(1993). Litigation was filed shortly after ERISA became effective and the Ha-
waii scheme was declared preempted. Standard Oil v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760 
(9th Cir. 1980), aff ’d, 454 U.S. 801 (1981). But ERISA was later amended—at 
the behest of Hawaiian senators—to save the program. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5). 
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cluding Wal-Mart) provide health care benefits through a plan 
covered by ERISA, preemption thus invalidates state or local 
laws that mandate that employers provide health insurance.  
In all, ERISA preemption forecloses direct attacks on Wal-
Mart’s low wages and paltry health benefits, and labor preemp-
tion makes it impossible for workers to enact state laws that 
make it feasible to organize themselves collectively and de-
mand better wages. The ability of communities to insist on a 
fundamentally different vision of the relationship between la-
bor and consumers—a producerist ethic or a higher wage, high-
er price strategy—is thwarted by preemption. 
II.  STATE AND LOCAL ORGANIZING AGAINST LOW-
WAGE RETAIL WORK: FAIR-SHARE LAWS AND FIGHTS 
OVER LAND-USE PLANNING   
With avenues to improve low-wage jobs and benefits 
through unionization or mandated employee benefits foreclosed 
by preemption, local activists have turned to areas of law that 
appear to be immune from preemption. In some jurisdictions, 
activists have pressed for the enactment of legislation that 
would require large employers either to spend a certain percen-
tage of their annual payroll expenditures on employee health 
care or to pay a tax to offset the government’s costs of providing 
health care for the uninsured. Although there is a good argu-
ment that this “fair-share” legislation is not a benefits mandate 
and therefore not preempted by ERISA, the recent Fourth Cir-
cuit decision in Retail Industry Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder casts 
some doubt on the viability of such legislation.41 The alterna-
tive strategy, which is largely immune from federal preemption 
challenges, is to use local governments’ land-use planning pow-
ers to ban Wal-Mart from certain areas. As we will explain, if 
ERISA preemption challenges push activists away from efforts 
to regulate wages and health insurance and into waging land-
use site fights against low-wage employers, then the costs of 
preemption for local governance and civic democracy are higher 
than is recognized. 
 
For an argument explaining why ERISA does not preempt every state law that 
mandates payments to employees, see Catherine L. Fisk, ERISA Preemption 
of State and Local Laws on Domestic Partnership and Sexual Orientation Dis-
crimination in Employment, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 267, 291–94 (1998).  
 41. 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007). 
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A. FAIR-SHARE LAWS AND ERISA PREEMPTION 
“Fair-share” or “pay or play” laws require an employer that 
does not provide health benefits to pay a tax or fee to cover the 
cost to the government of providing health care to low-wage 
workers.42 Around the country, fair-share and living-wage laws 
are supported by coalitions of unions representing workers in 
low-wage industries,43 grass-roots antipoverty organizations 
like Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now 
(ACORN), health care reform groups, and often faith-based 
groups with concerns about poverty. Their legislative goals are 
usually two-fold: to increase cash wages and access to health 
insurance. Fair-share legislation has been enacted in Massa-
chusetts, Maryland, San Francisco, and Suffolk County, New 
York, and is being considered in other places, including Cali-
fornia.44  
Maryland’s Fair Share Act requires every employer of 
10,000 or more Maryland employees to pay to the state an 
amount equal to the difference between what the employer 
spends on “health insurance costs” (a wide range of health-
related expenses including health insurance premiums, contri-
butions to health savings accounts, and the direct provision of 
health care to employees) and eight percent of its payroll 
costs.45 An employer that paid eight percent of its payroll in 
health expenses would pay nothing to the government. An em-
ployer that paid no health expenses would pay an eight percent 
payroll tax, and other employers would pay something in be-
tween.46 Maryland has few employers with more than 10,000 
employees, and none except Wal-Mart pays less than eight per-
cent of payroll in health expenses. Thus, as a practical matter 
 
 42. Amy Worden, Many Wal-Mart Workers Use Medicaid, PHILA. INQUIR-
ER, Mar. 2, 2006, at A1. 
 43. E.g., UFCW Facts: The Truth about Wal-Mart, http://www.grocery 
workersunited.org/walmarts_impact.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2008) (voicing 
support for fair-share laws and urging the rest of the membership of the Unit-
ed Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW) to support ef-
forts to enact fair-share legislation). 
 44. See, e.g., Amy B. Monahan, Pay or Play Laws, ERISA Preemption, and 
Potential Lessons from Massachusetts, 55 KAN. L. REV. 1203, 1204 (2007). The 
Maryland and Suffolk County legislation are described in detail below. The 
Massachusetts legislation was repealed. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188 
(2006), amended by 2007 Mass. Legis. Serv. 61 (West).  
 45. 2006 Md. Laws 1; MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8.5-101 to -107 
(LexisNexis 1999), invalidated by Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 
F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 46. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8.5-104(b). 
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the statute would change only Wal-Mart’s payroll costs. Suffolk 
County’s Fair Share for Health Care Act operates similarly. 
The Act required covered employers to make minimum em-
ployee health care expenditures equivalent to a portion of the 
cost to the public health care system of providing care to an un-
insured employee.47 The intent of the Massachusetts, Mary-
land, and Suffolk County legislation was to protect employers 
that provide health benefits and the public fisc from “unfair” 
competition from large employers that fail to provide health 
benefits.48 There are two reasons laws are drafted with the op-
tion of paying a more generous benefits package or paying an 
equivalent sum to some other person or entity. One is to avoid 
penalizing those employers that already provide generous bene-
fits, and the other is to avoid ERISA preemption. 
A living-wage law tries to achieve a similar goal through 
simple wage regulation: the employer must pay a wage of a cer-
tain amount plus benefits, or it can pay a higher cash wage but 
no benefits. This approach is used in most living-wage ordin-
ances and was recently tried in Chicago in a 2006 ordinance 
(which failed to survive a mayoral veto) that targeted big-box 
retailers.49 Unlike fair-share laws, living-wage laws are not 
vulnerable to federal preemption because the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, which regulates minimum wages, explicitly states 
that it does not preempt “any Federal or State law or municipal 
ordinance establishing a minimum wage higher than the min-
imum wage established under this chapter.”50 On the other 
hand, lower courts have concluded that ERISA does not 
preempt wage regulation schemes that calculate the minimum 
wage by reference to whether benefits are paid because they 
 
 47. SUFFOLK COUNTY, N.Y., REG. LOCAL LAWS § 325-3 (2005); see also 
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 22-506(c)(2) (2004). 
 48. Fielder, 475 F.3d at 183–84; Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Suffolk 
County, 497 F. Supp. 2d 403, 408 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).  
 49. See, e.g., Gary Washburn & Mickey Ciokajlo, ‘Big-Box’ Wage Law 
Passes, Aldermen Defy Mayor, Anger Retailers, CHI. TRIB., July 27, 2006, at 1 
(describing the Illinois Retail Merchants Association’s plans to challenge the 
constitutionality of the ordinance). Even before the measure was vetoed, there 
were doubts about whether it would survive a preemption challenge. See Mi-
chael Higgins & Gary Washburn, ‘Big-Box’ Law Faces Test, City Lawyers Ad-
vised Before Vote That Measure Legally Suspect, CHI. TRIB., July 28, 2006, at 1 
(suggesting Chicago’s big-box ordinance, like others around the country, faced 
difficult legal challenges). The ordinance was finally defeated by a mayoral ve-
to. See Gary Washburn & Mickey Ciokajlo, Daley Vetoes ‘Big-Box Law,’ CHI. 
TRIB., Sept. 12, 2006, at 11, 13.   
 50. 29 U.S.C. § 218 (2000). 
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deem such statutes permissible wage regulation rather than 
preempted benefits mandates.51 Under a doctrine known as 
home rule, many municipalities are authorized by their state 
constitutions to enact legislation relating to wages and working 
conditions to safeguard the health, safety, and welfare of the 
community.52 Although living-wage laws have proved relatively 
safe from preemption, health care advocates believe that they 
do not address the problem of the uninsured because the cost of 
health insurance for individuals is prohibitive and only group-
based health insurance (such as employer provided insurance) 
spreads the risk among a large enough pool of people to make 
the insurance affordable. Thus, fair-share legislation remains 
the preferred approach to addressing the lack of health care for 
the working poor. 
Some courts have concluded that ERISA preempts fair-
share laws. Most recently, the majority in a split Fourth Circuit 
decision concluded that ERISA preempted the Maryland Fair 
Share Health Act.53 The majority reasoned that the Act’s em-
ployer spending and benefit requirements fell within ERISA’s 
preemption provision because it effectively compelled employ-
ers to adjust their expenditures under their ERISA plans.54  
Maryland defended its law on the ground that the plan did 
not compel employers to establish or alter an ERISA plan; em-
ployers were free to pay the tax to the government or to make 
health care payments directly to the employees through general 
funds.55 The tax was not high enough to be a covert effort to 
force employers to provide benefits. Wal-Mart conceded that if 
it chose the tax option it faced an assessment of only one per-
 
 51. See e.g., Burgio v. N.Y. Dep’t of Labor, 107 F.3d 1000, 1011 (2d Cir. 
1997); WSB Elec. v. Curry, 88 F.3d 788, 796 (9th Cir. 1996); Minn. Chapter of 
Assoc. Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t of Labor, 47 F.3d 975, 981 
(8th Cir. 1995); Keystone Chapter, Assoc. Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Fo-
ley, 37 F.3d 945, 963 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 52. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1205(b) (West 2003) (stating that Califor-
nia state law does not preempt power of cities to exercise police powers); Bal-
timore v. Sitnick, 255 A.2d 376, 396 (Md. 1969) (finding that Maryland cities 
have power to enact wage laws); New Mexicans for Free Enter. v. City of San-
ta Fe, 126 P.3d 1149, 1160 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005) (concluding that a living-wage 
ordinance is within city’s home rule powers and not preempted by state law); 
Darin M. Dalmat, Note, Bringing Economic Justice Closer to Home: The Legal 
Viability of Local Minimum Wage Laws Under Home Rule, 39 COLUM. J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 93, 112–26 (2005). 
 53. Retail Indus. Leaders v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 198 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 54. Id. at 193–94, 197. 
 55. Id. at 194–96. 
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cent of its Maryland payroll expenditures.56 Nevertheless, the 
Fourth Circuit majority decided the statute was effectively a 
mandate.57 The tax provided an incentive for employers to es-
tablish or to improve their ERISA-covered health benefit plans, 
and the court therefore reasoned that a “reasonable employer” 
would not forego the chance to improve the morale of present 
employees and the ability to attract more and better new em-
ployees by offering benefits.58 In contrast, “an employer would 
gain nothing in consideration of paying a greater sum of money 
to the state” because “it might suffer from lower employee mo-
rale and increased public condemnation.”59 
The majority did not distinguish, nor did it even cite, any 
of the cases upholding living-wage laws that gave employers 
the option of paying more cash or less cash plus health or other 
benefits. These laws, like the Maryland law, create an incentive 
for employers to gain the goodwill of their employees and the 
public by providing benefits. As the dissent pointed out, the 
lower court decisions upholding living-wage laws emphasize 
that such laws impose only a slight burden of calculating and 
reporting amounts spent on health care benefits, and this bur-
den is too slight to trigger ERISA preemption.60  
Maryland also defended its law on the ground that employ-
ers could make health care expenditures on behalf of employees 
by funding clinics or through other sorts of expenditures that 
did not require the establishment of an ERISA plan.61 This ar-
gument found support in two Supreme Court decisions, Fort 
Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,62 and Massachusetts v. Morash,63 
which held that ERISA does not preempt state laws requiring 
the payment of severance pay and unused vacation pay to em-
ployees because these laws affected “payroll practices,” not 
benefit plans.64 The Supreme Court reasoned that although 
 
 56. Id. at 202 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
 57. Id. at 198 (majority opinion). 
 58. Id. at 193. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 201–02 (Michael, J., dissenting) (citing Burgio & Campofelice, 
Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 107 F.3d 1000, 1009 (2d Cir. 1997); Keystone 
Chapter, Assoc. Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Foley, 37 F.3d 945, 961 (3d Cir. 
1994); Minn. Chapter of Assoc. Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t of 
Labor & Indus., 866 F. Supp. 1244, 1247 (D. Minn. 1993)). 
 61. Fielder, 475 F.3d at 196. 
 62. 482 U.S. 1, 19 (1987). 
 63. 490 U.S. 107, 112–14 (1990). 
 64. Id. at 108. 
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these benefits might be offered in programs that constitute 
ERISA plans, they need not be because such benefits are usual-
ly paid out of general operating revenues and do not require 
substantial reserves to be calculated based on complex actuari-
al assumptions.65 The Fourth Circuit rejected the analogy be-
tween these state laws and the Maryland fair-share law be-
cause it would be administratively difficult to make the 
required health care expenditures unless they established an 
ERISA plan.66 
The Fourth Circuit majority’s analysis is inconsistent with 
a number of the Supreme Court’s most recent ERISA preemp-
tion decisions. In New York State Conference of Blue Cross & 
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., the Court upheld a New 
York law that regulated the cost of hospital services and pro-
vided a lower cost if services were paid by nonprofit providers 
than if the costs were paid by for-profit insurers.67 Although 
Travelers Insurance Company argued that ERISA preempted 
the law because it regulated employee benefit plans, the Court 
disagreed, explaining that the health reimbursement law did 
not “bind plan administrators to any particular choice”68 about 
which benefits to provide, nor did it “preclude uniform adminis-
trative practice or the provision of a uniform interstate benefit 
package if a plan wishes to provide one.”69 The Court concluded 
that state laws could impose different costs on ERISA plans 
without triggering ERISA preemption because “cost uniformity 
[between states] with only an indirect economic effect on the 
relative costs of various health insurance packages in a given 
State are a far cry from those conflicting directives from which 
Congress meant to insulate ERISA plans.”70 
Similarly, in California Division of Labor Standards En-
forcement v. Dillingham Construction Co., the Court rejected an 
ERISA preemption challenge to a state law that required em-
ployers to pay prevailing-wage rates to apprentices.71 Because 
most apprenticeship programs, including the ones at issue in 
Dillingham, were ERISA plans, the law effectively required 
 
 65. Coyne, 482 U.S. at 11–12. 
 66. Fielder, 475 F.3d at 196–97. 
 67. 514 U.S. 645, 645 (1995). 
 68. Id. at 659.  
 69. Id. at 660 (citing Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Melendan, 498 U.S. 133, 142 
(1990)). 
 70. Id. at 662 (citing Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U.S. at 139). 
 71. 519 U.S. 316, 316 (1997). 
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employers to participate in an ERISA plan. Nevertheless, be-
cause it was possible for a state-approved apprenticeship pro-
gram to be financed from the employer’s general assets rather 
than through an ERISA plan, the Court decided that the state 
law functioned “irrespective of . . . the existence of an ERISA 
plan” and was therefore not preempted.72  
Read together, these cases suggest that ERISA preempts 
laws if they can be complied with only by adopting an ERISA-
covered benefit plan or by changing the terms of an ERISA 
plan. Conversely, laws that regulate working conditions but 
will affect employees hired or paid through an ERISA plan (as 
in Dillingham) or that regulate the cost of health care and af-
fect the amount that ERISA plans pay for certain kinds of 
health care services (as in Travelers) are not preempted. ERISA 
does not preempt these laws because they primarily regulate 
something within the legitimate sphere of state and local gov-
ernment and affect ERISA plans in pursuit of the local regula-
tory objective. As noted above, laws that primarily regulate 
payroll practices but could affect employers who provide certain 
compensation through a benefits plan are not preempted under 
the reasoning of Fort Halifax Packing Company v. Coyne73 and 
Massachusetts v. Morash,74 which allow states to regulate leave 
policies and to mandate payment for unused sickness or vaca-
tion leave even though sometimes the sums are paid by an 
ERISA-covered plan.75 In other words, ERISA does not preempt 
state statutes that provide an indirect incentive for employers 
to make expenditures that could be covered through an ERISA-
covered plan but that would not have to be.76  
The Fourth Circuit majority’s argument set these cases 
aside because, in its view, unlike the state laws at issue there, 
the Maryland Fair Share Health Act effectively compelled cov-
ered employers to make health care expenditures either into an 
ERISA plan directly or set by reference to the amount that 
would be paid to an ERISA plan if the employer had one.77 
Principal support for this contention was based on the Supreme 
 
 72. Id. at 328. 
 73. 482 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1987) (holding that ERISA preempts state laws relat-
ing to employee benefit plans rather than employee benefits in general). 
 74. 490 U.S. 107 (1989). 
 75. Id. at 113–21. 
 76. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 653 (1995). 
 77. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 193–94 (4th Cir. 
2007). 
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Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Greater Washington 
Board of Trade,78 which invalidated a provision of a D.C. work-
ers’ compensation law that required employers that provided 
medical insurance to employees to provide equivalent insur-
ance to any employee who received or was eligible to receive 
workers’ compensation.79 In that case, however, the local law 
was an absolute mandate to provide benefits, and there was no 
option to pay a tax or to make expenditures other than through 
an ERISA plan.80 In both Travelers and Dillingham, the Court 
emphasized that ERISA should not be interpreted to preempt 
laws within the traditional police powers of the states unless 
the law requires the employer to provide benefits or forbids a 
method of calculating benefits that federal law permits.81 Regu-
lation of wages and dealing with the problem of health care for 
the poor are within the scope of traditional police powers.82 As 
noted above, fair-share laws do not require employers to pro-
vide benefits through an ERISA plan and do not forbid ERISA 
plans from operating in any particular way.83 While it is true 
that such laws provide an incentive for employers to establish 
an ERISA plan or to improve benefits under one, those laws do 
not require it. And that requirement is the crucial aspect of the 
ERISA preemption analysis. 
Courts must make judgments in deciding ERISA preemp-
tion issues about the degree of effect a state law may have on 
an ERISA plan.84 That judgment is inevitable, and in the case 
of the Maryland Fair Share and other similar laws, the ques-
tion is whether the effort to fund health care shades too much 
toward an effort to dictate the content of ERISA plans, or ra-
 
 78. 506 U.S. 125, 129 (1992). 
 79. Id.  
 80. See id. at 128 (describing the requirements of the law at issue). 
 81. See De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 
806, 813 n.8 (1997); California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. 
Dillingham Construction Co., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997); Travelers, 514 U.S. at 
654–55. 
 82. See, e.g., Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668 (stating that regulation of insur-
ance and matters relating to health are within police powers); De Canas v. Bi-
ca, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976) (holding that regulation of employment is within 
police powers). 
 83. See supra notes 41–61 and accompanying text. 
 84. Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA 
Preemption? A Case Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
35, 90–91 (1996) (arguing that in the analysis of whether a state law “relates 
to” an employee benefit plan, judges should focus on the policy underlying 
ERISA instead of statutory text, which is inherently ambiguous). 
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ther is an effort to regulate wages and health care that has an 
effect on ERISA plans. To accept the Fourth Circuit majority’s 
characterization of the Maryland statute as a benefit 
mandate,85 one must ignore all the cases that uphold living-
wage laws against ERISA preemption challenges. If living-
wage legislation allowing an employer to choose between pay-
ing more cash, or less cash plus benefits to employees, is not 
preempted because it does not sufficiently “relate to” an ERISA 
plan, courts should not deem legislation allowing an employer 
to choose between paying $X to the government or $X to em-
ployees in the form of health care to “relate to” an employee 
benefit plan.  
Contrary to the Fourth Circuit majority’s characterization, 
an employer who thought it economically unwise or admini-
stratively infeasible to pay health care costs might conclude 
that paying the tax was the rational option. The tax would 
compel employers to provide benefits only if the tax was dra-
matically more expensive than paying benefits, and in Mary-
land, it was not. As applied to Wal-Mart, the tax would be only 
one percent of payroll. Even an employer who made no health 
care expenditures would pay a maximum tax of eight percent of 
payroll. Since the Maryland law made the tax equivalent to the 
cost of providing benefits, it is hard to see how the law was re-
ally a mandate to provide benefits. As the Fourth Circuit ma-
jority recognized, the only reason an employer would choose to 
pay benefits rather than the tax is to make its employees hap-
py. Therefore, on the court’s reasoning, the real choice confront-
ing the employer is the administrative cost of altering its 
health benefits policies as compared to the personnel costs of 
having disgruntled employees (while still paying up to eight 
percent of payroll in health care expenditures). The employer’s 
own fear of employee wrath is hardly a government mandate.  
The Fourth Circuit majority also reasoned that  
the Fair Share Act and a proliferation of similar laws in other juris-
dictions would force Wal-Mart or any employer like it to monitor 
these varying laws and manipulate its healthcare spending to comply 
with them, whether by increasing contributions to its ERISA plans or 
navigating the narrow regulatory channel between the Fair Share 
Act’s definition of healthcare spending and ERISA’s definition of an 
employee benefit plan.86  
 
 85. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 U.S. F.3d 180, 193–94 (4th 
Cir. 2007). 
 86. Id. at 197. 
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This suggests that ERISA preempts any state or local law 
that requires an employer to “monitor” local laws and change 
its pay practices accordingly, if the employer would have to 
tweak its spending to avoid paying out more in cash by paying 
more in health benefits. That reasoning is flatly inconsistent 
both with the Supreme Court’s decisions and with lower court 
decisions upholding living-wage laws.87 
Even if the Fourth Circuit majority’s view were to become 
the law nationwide, employee activists are still right to persist 
in seeking the enactment of fair-share legislation because such 
laws can be written to comply with the court’s strict limits. To 
take one example, a state could impose a payroll tax specifically 
denominated to raise revenue to fund Medicaid and give em-
ployers who provide health benefits a credit reflecting the 
amount or percentage of payroll it spends on health care.88 The 
tax would seem less like an effort to coerce employers to pro-
vide benefits if the employer that spent less on benefits than 
required by the tax could be eligible for the full credit by spend-
ing only half as much in health costs on its employees (because 
employer expenditures on benefits are deductible from the em-
ployer’s income tax as a business expense).89 Thus, if the Medi-
caid revenue tax were set at ten percent of payroll, an employer 
who presently paid no benefits could be exempt from the tax by 
paying five percent of payroll to employees in health costs. An 
employer that currently spent four percent of payroll on health 
costs could get a full credit against the other six percent by pay-
ing an additional three percent of payroll in health costs. This 
scheme would allow only states to enact fair-share laws, as 
municipalities do not fund Medicaid. If municipal legislation 
were enacted, presumably, it would have to be designed to raise 
revenue to fund whatever part of health costs are paid by mu-
nicipalities. 
In sum, fair-share legislation remains a viable, if complex, 
arena for local activism. While preemption litigation can be 
prolonged, complex, and pose a threat to the immediate success 
of local activism, there is a way to avoid ERISA preemption. 
 
 87. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text. 
 88. Darren Abernethy, Note, Of State Laboratories and Legislative Alloys: 
How “Fair-Share” Laws Can Be Written to Avoid ERISA Preemption and In-
fluence Private Sector Health Care Reform in America, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1859, 1883–84 (2008). 
 89. Id. at 1884–85. 
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B. LAND-USE PLANNING AS A STRATEGY TO ADDRESS LOW-WAGE 
WORK 
With federal labor and ERISA preemption foreclosing some 
avenues for attacking low-wage labor conditions directly and 
raising the specter of expensive and prolonged federal court lit-
igation, activists often turn to zoning or land-use laws to con-
trol Wal-Mart’s entry into a local, regional,90 or state market.91 
These “site fights” use local planning regulation to prevent or 
restructure development proposals by imposing parking, aes-
thetic, or site-layout standards, building size or display and 
sale limits, or environmental and community impact assess-
ment requirements.92 Some localities wield their zoning powers 
to summarily ban superstores like Wal-Mart,93 while others 
scrutinize proposals on a case-by-case basis, approving projects 
only if conditions are agreed to or met.94 Nearly every site fight 
involves diverse coalitional support, often including labor un-
ions, faith-based organizations, and community groups.95 And 
since land use is of wholly local concern, the approach has the 
crucial benefit of avoiding preemption entirely. Wal-Mart’s 
failed attempt to place a Supercenter in Inglewood, Califor-
nia—Wal-Mart’s first Supercenter defeat—caused company ex-
ecutives to rethink expansion strategies and is perhaps the pa-
radigmatic successful site fight.96  
The Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE), a 
worker advocacy group, first uncovered Wal-Mart’s plans to 
open a Supercenter in the African American community of In-
 
 90. George Lefcoe, The Regulation of Superstores: The Legality of Zoning 
Ordinances Emerging from the Skirmishes Between Wal-Mart and the United 
Food and Commercial Workers, 58 ARK. L. REV. 833, 833 (2006). 
 91. Kris Hudson, States Target Big-Box Stores, WALL ST. J., June 29, 
2007, at A8. 
 92. Patricia E. Salkin, Supersizing Small Town America: Using Regional-
ism to Right-Size Big Box Retail, 6 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 48, 54–55 (2005). 
 93. Lefcoe, supra note 90, at 842. 
 94. Id. at 845. 
 95. See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 38, at 1960. 
 96. See id. at 1975–76 (“[In] the aftermath of the Inglewood fight . . . Wal-
Mart has placed less emphasis on targeting Superstore development in major 
cities . . . focusing on the international market . . . [and] small domestic ci-
ties.”); CEO Aims to Repair Wal-Mart Name, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2004, at C5 
(“‘We have got to eliminate this constant barrage of negatives that cause 
people . . . to wonder if Wal-Mart will be allowed to grow,’ said [CEO] Scott.”); 
Jessica Garrison et al., Wal-Mart to Push Southland Agenda, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 
8, 2004, at B1. 
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glewood in March 2002.97 Joining with the United Food and 
Commercial Workers (UFCW) and community, faith, and polit-
ical leaders,98 LAANE successfully lobbied the city council to 
enact an emergency ordinance banning “retail stores larger 
than 155,000 square feet that sold more than 20,000 nontaxa-
ble items, such as food,” effectively barring the company from 
Inglewood.99 But faced with Wal-Mart’s threats to both chal-
lenge the ordinance in court and force a repeal referendum, the 
council quickly overturned it.100 Fighting back, UFCW success-
fully pushed a slate of anti-Wal-Mart candidates onto the coun-
cil in hopes of reenacting the ban.101 In response, Wal-Mart 
formed a front group to organize a ballot initiative allowing 
construction of a Supercenter and Sam’s Club while bypassing 
the standard city review and approval processes.102 Faced with 
this concrete challenge, Inglewood’s anti-Wal-Mart actors coa-
lesced to create the Coalition for a Better Inglewood (CBI), se-
curing endorsements and garnering opposition to the measure 
through media outreach, community meetings, and door-to-
door canvassing.103 CBI branded the measure an “illegitimate 
power grab” that freed Wal-Mart to ignore the standard legal 
process;104 the appeal worked, as voters defeated the initiative 
by a wide margin.105 
The site fight’s success spread beyond Inglewood.106 De-
spite these victories, some observers caution that the approach 
 
 97. Cummings, supra note 38, at 1957. 
 98. Id. at 1957, 1960. 
 99. Id. at 1958. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1958–59. 
 102. Id. at 1959; Nancy Cleeland & Abigail Goldman, Wal-Mart Trying to 
Put Plan on Ballot; The Retailer Is Seeking Approval for a New Store in Ingle-
wood from the City’s Voters, Not Its Council Members, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 
2003, at A1; see also Initiative Measure to Be Submitted to the Voters (Meas-
ure 04-A) § 12–2001.1 G.8 (“The Home Stretch Specific Plan is a comprehen-
sive, stand alone planning document that preempts and replaces all of the 
standards, criteria, [and] procedures for review . . . .”), available at http://www 
.cityofinglewood.org/pdfs/Home%20Page/doc.pdf; Measure 04-A § 12–200.1.B.  
 103. Cummings, supra note 38, at 1960–63. 
 104. Id. at 1962. 
 105. Sarah Lin & Monte Morin, Voters in Inglewood Turn Away Wal-Mart, 
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2004, at A1 (“With all votes counted Tuesday evening, 
4,575 Inglewood residents had voted in favor of Wal-Mart’s plan, while 7,049 
had voted against it.”). 
 106. See, e.g., Michael Barbaro & Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart Chief 
Writes Off New York, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2007, at C1 (“Frustrated by a bruis-
ing, and so far unsuccessful battle to open its first discount store in the na-
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is not immune to legal challenges based on doubts about 
whether local land-use decisions can be designed to address la-
bor market concerns rather than traffic flow or other tradition-
al zoning issues.107 Others question the longevity of a “reactive, 
case-by-case” tactic that requires a diverse cast of actors allied 
in every corner of the nation.108 Professor Scott Cummings, who 
studied the Inglewood campaign in detail, describes how what 
began as a labor cause quickly required land-use and environ-
mental experts, resulting in an unconventional, “fragile al-
liance.”109 Correspondingly, participants’ motivations ranged 
widely, from the purely political, to fears the company would 
pollute, to beliefs the land could be better used, to hopes that 
the fight would energize a wave of community action.110  
In one respect this interdisciplinary character represents a 
stirring new approach to labor activism, broadening arguments 
and tactics without sacrificing the core end of preventing fur-
ther degradation of working conditions for low-end service 
workers.111 In another respect, however, it represents a star-
tling redirection, sublimating basic issues of dignity and justice 
for zoning. When the struggle for wages, health care, and un-
ions is abstracted, something the site fight prompts, there may 
be civic consequences.  
III.  PREEMPTION’S DELETERIOUS EFFECTS ON CIVIC 
DEMOCRACY   
The possibility that some fair-share legislation may survive 
preemption challenges and the success of some site fights offer 
hope that local activism can continue and even flourish. But 
when preemption forces activism around low-wage work and 
access to health care into the side streets of land-use law and 
the complexities of working around ERISA, it produces both 
civic-democratic and legal consequences beyond the immediate 
success or failure of the particular legislative campaign. To 
date, no state other than Maryland has enacted a big-box-
 
tion’s largest city, Wal-Mart’s chief executive said yesterday, ‘I don’t care if we 
are ever here.’”). 
 107. Lefcoe, supra note 90, at 833. 
 108. Cummings, supra note 38, at 1997 (“[T]he large number of separate 
jurisdictions gives Wal-Mart many potential targets, [so] the site fight strate-
gy could easily be stretched too thin.”). 
 109. Id. at 1989. 
 110. Id. at 1989–90. 
 111. Professor Cummings suggests that the site fight “represents an impor-
tant part of ‘next wave’ labor activism.” Id. at 1978. 
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specific minimum labor standards law, though some have 
tried.112 The federal court decision holding the Maryland law 
preempted establishes both a legal and a civic roadblock.113 
Preemption’s potential to abruptly obliterate months or even 
years of successful local political activism through a judicial ra-
tionale the average person would probably find perplexing may 
have real democratic reverberations. As we explain below, 
preemption both derails democracy and deforms democracy. 
A. DEMOCRACY DERAILED: PREEMPTION AND THE MARYLAND 
FAIR SHARE ACT 
Sociologists and political theorists have observed that 
democratic activism is not the natural disposition of the body 
politic.114 Rather, it is culturally created.115 A fertile culture for 
civic activism is one where persons become enveloped in social 
networks that cogently articulate the interactions between pri-
vate and public problems.116 There, space is created for new 
identities and solidarities mobilized to voice grievances in the 
public square through the political process.117 The organiza-
tions and associations that dot America’s cities and towns often 
formalize such networks, providing both the training ground 
and engine of civic activism, making politics a lived expe-
rience.118 As Alexis de Tocqueville observed, involvement in lo-
cal organizations provides Americans “an infinite number of oc-
casions for the citizens to act together . . . so that every day 
they should feel that they depended on one another.”119  
 
 112. See Hudson, supra note 91 (citing AFL-CIO efforts to replicate the 
Maryland law in three dozen states). 
 113. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 114. RICHARD L. WOOD, FAITH IN ACTION 264 (2002) (citing NINA ELIA-
SOPH, AVOIDING POLITICS: HOW AMERICANS PRODUCE APATHY IN EVERYDAY 
LIFE (1998)). 
 115. Id. 
 116. See HARRY C. BOYTE, THE BACKYARD REVOLUTION 196 (1980). 
 117. ROMAND COLES, BEYOND GATED POLITICS 218 (2005). 
 118. See Michael S. Joyce & William A. Schambra, A New Civic Life, in PE-
TER L. BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: FROM 
STATE TO CIVIL SOCIETY 12 (Michael Nowak ed., 2d ed. 1996) (“Through these 
small, local, ‘human-scale’ associations, Americans not only achieved a sense 
of belonging and connectedness but also tackled the full range of social and 
human problems that today have largely become the province of govern-
ment.”). 
 119. Id. at 13; see also ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 
513–17 (J.P. Mayer ed., Anchor 1969) (1835). 
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But if democratic activism is culturally mediated, demo-
cratic apathy may be as well. Among the factors contributing to 
a decline of American civic life we would include the possibility 
of preemption of state law alongside the usual culprits, which 
generally include a dearth of social capital, weakened political 
institutions, and “the inculcation of democratic skills in ways 
skewed by socioeconomic inequality, racial/ethnic identity, and 
gender.”120 Preemption disempowers local government, and 
with that loss of power goes loss of a reason for citizens to par-
ticipate in civic life. 
Indeed, community organizers have long recognized that 
groups, associations, and other community efforts may attack 
“problems,” things that are difficult or impossible to change, or 
they may attack “issues,” where change is possible or realis-
tic.121 Explains Ed Chambers, Executive Director of the Indus-
trial Areas Foundations (IAF), which is the largest community 
organizing network in the nation: “The sale and consumption of 
illegal drugs is a problem; tearing down six specifically identi-
fied crack houses in a neighborhood is an issue . . . . Effective 
actions target issues, not problems.”122 What Chambers inti-
mates and what other seasoned organizers understand is that 
where victories are or seem possible, activism can flourish. And 
where victories are or seem impossible, activism can wilt.123 A 
group’s belief in its ability to effect change can lead its mem-
bers to action and vice versa.124 A 1997 study in Science, for ex-
ample, reported a strong link between a community’s sense 
that its members had the “collective efficacy” or group power to 
affect public safety and reduced levels of violence.125 While 
every neighborhood desired a safe environment, only in neigh-
borhoods where residents believed they could influence inter-
personal crime did they actually do so.126 
 
 120. WOOD, supra note 114, at 16 (providing additional citations for each of 
the categories).  
 121. EDWARD T. CHAMBERS, ROOTS FOR RADICALS 84 (2006). 
 122. Id. 
 123. WOOD, supra note 114, at 202. 
 124. Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multi-
level Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918, 918 (1997). 
 125. Id. (comparing only poor neighborhoods and controlling for individual-
level characteristics and prior violence). 
 126. Id. (suggesting that “neighborhoods differentially activate informal 
social controls” that may discourage violence, such as monitoring children’s 
spontaneous playgroups, intervening before teenagers engage in truancy, and 
confronting those who are disturbing public spaces). 
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Further, Robert Putnam’s studies of civic engagement sug-
gest that tangible accomplishments are important for associa-
tional sustainability because victories evolve into stories of col-
lective triumph, which, in turn, foment intragroup connections 
and ultimately catalyze activism.127 At UPS, where the Team-
sters union’s civic practices foster “dense and cooperative con-
nections among the employees,”128 workers successfully navi-
gate the immensely difficult holiday package rush by 
motivating each other with “folklore” of Christmases past, 
where UPS workers outpaced the competition against incredi-
ble obstacles.129 Such triumph stories spark a powerful unity, 
exemplified at UPS by the Teamsters’ victorious 1997 strike.130 
The stories may also eventually spur communities to view ac-
tivism normatively, instilling a collective belief that, together, 
anything is possible: “The visible and active presence of a re-
markable number of people who think it’s possible to do 
things . . . convinces others that it is possible, desirable, and 
even expected that they, too, will participate and accomplish 
something.”131 
The Maryland Fair Share Act, as enacted, might have eli-
cited the kind of faith in the power of civic engagement that 
Putnam lauded. Wal-Mart’s inadequate health benefits proved 
to be a conquerable “issue,” a stirring tale of “collective tri-
umph” that activists might have drawn on in future fights. A 
sense of “collective efficacy” might have seeped into Maryland 
communities. Preemption of Maryland’s Fair Share Act, how-
ever, cut off that process. Preemption rendered Wal-Mart’s poor 
health benefits a “problem,” not an “issue.” In place of collective 
efficacy there is more likely to be collective confusion: Why 
could Maryland not legislate to address the problem of low-
wage work and affordable health care? Why does a federal law 
that provides no benefits itself deprive a state of the power to 
do so?  
 
 127. See PUTNAM & FELDSTEIN, supra note 26, at 284. 
 128. Id. at 216. 
 129. Id. at 211. 
 130. See id. at 217–18 (noting that the 1997 Teamsters strike cost UPS 
$750 million); Steven Greenhouse, Yearlong Effort Key to Success for Team-
sters, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1997, at A1 (“[T]he teamsters[ won] most of what 
they sought in their 15-day strike against U.P.S. It was labor’s biggest victory 
in years . . . .”). 
 131. PUTNAM & FELDSTEIN, supra note 26, at 255–56 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
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Political philosopher Michael Sandel fears civic apathy be-
cause it generates a “storyless condition” of extreme disempo-
werment, a book of empty narratives without “continuity be-
tween present and past, and therefore no responsibility, and 
therefore no possibility of acting together.”132 The Maryland 
experience of activism arguably generated something worse. A 
distinct narrative was indeed set: local triumph destroyed. And 
in this tale, while only a legal expert might prove capable of ex-
plaining the ending, activists could surely internalize the moral 
“why even bother?”133  
Preemption’s neutralization of Maryland’s minimum-
standards approach is thus a portrait of local democracy de-
railed. Maryland residents concerned about Wal-Mart’s health 
benefits are now left with two options: organize at the more 
conservative federal level where their power is weakest,134 or 
pressure Wal-Mart to make changes voluntarily.135 Either op-
tion could potentially implicate civic practices, from writing a 
letter to a U.S. Senator in favor of pro-worker legislation to 
signing a petition to Wal-Mart’s CEO urging workplace 
changes. But writing a letter to Congress or to Wal-Mart execu-
tives is a solitary act, and the sort of gesture that is often per-
ceived as futile. It is no substitute for participation in effective 
self-governance. 
Indeed, as political philosopher Sheldon Wolin has com-
mented, democracy’s true power resides not in the halls of Con-
gress or a corporate boardroom but “in the multiplicity of mod-
est sites dispersed among local governments and institutions 
under local control . . . and in the ingenuity of ordinary people 
in inventing temporary forms to meet their needs.”136 Such 
 
 132. SANDEL, supra note 34, at 351. 
 133. Cf. WOOD, supra note 114, at 131 (“[P]ublic life must be regularly ree-
nacted by groups drawing on social capital and democratic skills to project 
democratic power; otherwise, public life withers.”). 
 134. See Cummings, supra note 38, at 1942 (suggesting that progressive 
activists have deemphasized advocacy at the federal level because it is often 
more conservative than the local level, where politicians can be more easily 
influenced and where low-wage workers represent an important constituency). 
 135. See, e.g., Rathke, supra note 10, at 270–73 (arguing that unionization 
at Wal-Mart cannot succeed, thus the best hope for improving working condi-
tions is to create a Wal-Mart worker “association” armed with pressure tactics 
and a “potent public-policy voice”); KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO 
DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 230–31 
(2004) (advocating “citizen unionism,” which pressures employers to voluntari-
ly improve working conditions). 
 136. SHELDON WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION 603 (2004). Wolin terms this 
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“temporary forms” catalyze and nurture creative civic practices 
locally, and to shunt this entire category of local practices aside 
is to circumscribe democracy, molding it into a more “settled 
system” by repressing its potential as an “ephemeral phenome-
non . . . embracing a wide range of possible forms and muta-
tions.”137 Yet that is preemption’s oft-overlooked effect, permit-
ting two forms of democratic change—federal and voluntary—
to trump the local form that might best “generate and conti-
nuously renew direct political experience.”138  
B. DEMOCRACY DEFORMED: PREEMPTION AND THE INGLEWOOD 
SITE FIGHT 
Site fights do offer the opportunity for civic engagement 
with local government that Wolin describes. Yet, the usual top-
ics of land-use planning—square footage, sign size and place-
ment, traffic flow—are far removed from the issues that spark 
most anti-Wal-Mart activism: wages and health benefits. The 
most effective organizing is rooted in issues that have direct, 
identifiable significance in participants’ lives, rather than is-
sues developed top-down by strategists after surveying the po-
litical or legal landscape.139 For example, the IAF’s organizing 
is rooted not around what is rhetorically, tactically, or political-
ly convenient but around the specific frustration that animates 
a neighborhood (for instance, an abandoned building) as eli-
cited though what the group calls “relational meetings.”140 IAF 
groups emerge publicly only once such frustrations have been 
identified, typically after two to three years of meetings be-
tween organizers and neighborhood residents.141 Writes Cham-
bers, “You don’t pick targets and mobilize first; you connect 
people in and around their interests.”142 Shared interests, not a 
contrived political strategy, are the point of entry for people to 
engage in civic democracy and public life.143 
Site fights do not fit this paradigm well. The zoning issues 
bound up in such campaigns are but convenient proxies for 
 
“fugitive” democracy. Id. at 602. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 604. 
 139. See MARK R. WARREN, DRY BONES RATTLING 51 (2001). 
 140. CHAMBERS, supra note 121, at 50–53. 
 141. See id. at 48 (“In bringing the United Power organization to birth in 
metropolitan Chicago from 1995 to 1997, the organizers and initial leaders 
conducted 9,000 to 9,500 relational meetings over two years . . . .”).  
 142. Id. at 46. 
 143. Id. at 50. 
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health care and labor rights concerns. Surely some site-fight 
actors experience a “cold anger”144 over declining community 
aesthetics and for them zoning concerns are legitimately cen-
tral.145 But for most, preventing the “Wal-Martization”146 of the 
economy by denying Wal-Mart the power to dictate labor stan-
dards is the true concern and motivator. Imagine Wal-Mart’s 
lowest paid employees earned $20 per hour with free health, 
dental, and vision benefits and a retirement plan. Would Wal-
Mart’s proposed entry into New York, Chicago, or Southern 
California provoke the same level of fierce resistance? Would 
there be any resistance? For community members concerned 
about wages and health care, the fears Wal-Mart provokes are 
reformulated, redirected, and repackaged by the site-fight 
strategy.  
To see such sublimation in action one need look only to In-
glewood. There, the first strike against Wal-Mart’s encroach-
ment was for LAANE and UFCW—worker advocacy groups—to 
lobby for an emergency land ordinance.147 The battle would ul-
timately pivot on the merits of Wal-Mart’s oversized zoning in-
itiative, which anti-Wal-Mart advocates defeated on the 
strength of a procedural fairness—not labor—message.148 
While union density, low wages versus low prices, and other 
worker-centered arguments played campaign roles, on election 
day such issues were relegated to the level of white noise. This 
vote was primarily about a building permit, not workers’ 
rights.149 Indeed, the day before the vote, LAANE’s executive 
 
 144. Id. at 108. See MARY BETH ROGERS, COLD ANGER 10 (1990) (describing 
the anger of the working poor and their attempts at political intervention). 
 145. See generally ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF 
SPRAWL AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (2000) (describing the 
aesthetic consequences of unregulated urban growth); ANTHONY FLINT, THIS 
LAND: THE BATTLE OVER SPRAWL AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA (2006). 
 146. See Editorial, supra note 28 (“This Wal-Martization of the work force, 
to which other low-cost, low-pay stores also contribute, threatens to push 
many Americans into poverty.”). 
 147. See Lin & Morin, supra note 105; LAANE, A New Vision for Economic 
Fairness, http://www.laane.org/about.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). 
 148. See Lin & Morin, supra note 105. 
 149. See id. (“The expansion encountered fierce opposition from organized 
labor, which insisted that Wal-Mart’s aggressive business practices and anti-
union employment policies would result in lost jobs and depressed wages for 
millions of workers. . . . The question on Tuesday’s ballot in Inglewood was 
whether to allow the retailer to obtain building permits without a public hear-
ing or environmental impact study. Many community leaders and Inglewood 
city officials, except the mayor, said the measure would set a dangerous 
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director, Madeline Janis-Aparicio, stressed the crucial impor-
tance of the outcome, but for reasons that might seem surpris-
ing for an organization devoted to economic, not property, jus-
tice150: “The stakes in Inglewood are the highest they have ever 
been anywhere. They want to throw out all the local planning 
laws and make themselves a little Wal-Mart city.”151 Janis-
Aparicio referenced labor issues only tangentially, characteris-
tic of the doom associated with a Wal-Mart-controlled en-
clave.152 Her true emphasis was land use. 
Thus, while the land-use approach can be effective,153 the 
strategy also imparts a clear cost. The particular interests that 
might animate a community opposed to Wal-Mart seem likely 
to be fears of low wages, inadequate health care, or any number 
of other issues related to the company, yet the site fight plows 
the way for just one: land use. By artificially and unilaterally 
manufacturing this shared interest, the site fight serves as a 
one-size-fits-all funneling mechanism that turns the fundamen-
tal IAF insight—that organizing issues are best generated bot-
tom-up based on interests, not top-down based on strategy—on 
its head, leaving the foundation for democratic action less stur-
dy and less likely to spark sustained activist responses.154  
Then again, some social theorists argue that in some cir-
cumstances self-fulfillment can actually enable political and 
group commitments.155 Further, they argue that purely person-
al investments in an organization do not necessarily sap its col-
lective strength.156 Sociologist Paul Lichterman calls this “per-
sonalism” and cites twelve-step addiction groups157 and some 
 
precedent for cities nationwide by preempting local control over development 
process and circumventing environmental review of large projects.”). 
 150. See LAANE: Building a City of Justice, http://www.laane.org (last vi-
sited Apr. 18, 2008) (“At LAANE, we are committed to building a new economy 
that restores the American dream of fair wages and benefits in return for hard 
work.”). 
 151. Garrison & Lin, supra note 1. 
 152. See id. 
 153. Harold Meyerson, Wal-Mart Comes North, AM. PROSPECT, Apr. 2007, 
at 28, 29 (“[C]ity councils across California and Oregon, New York and New 
England have enacted big-box ordinances blocking Wal-Mart from moving into 
their jurisdictions.”).  
 154. See CHAMBERS, supra note 121, at 108 (“Effective public-life organiz-
ers and leaders feel that anger, listen to it, and act on it.”). 
 155. PAUL LICHTERMAN, THE SEARCH FOR POLITICAL COMMUNITY 4 (1996). 
 156. Id. at 10 (“Certainly members of a community may be ‘personally’ in-
vested in it: their feelings are an important part of their sense of communal 
belonging.”). 
 157. Id. at 8. 
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small political organizations as examples of the phenomenon 
where members bring deeply individualized motivations to bear 
on public commitments toward a common good.158 But Lich-
terman readily acknowledges studies by Robert Bellah and oth-
ers suggesting that if personal motivations cannot be defined 
“in terms of communal obligations, then those commitments 
would have a precarious basis, and might not last long . . . only 
to reemerge in some other short-lived personal enthusiasm.”159 
The site fight might be like some of the small political or 
twelve-step groups Lichterman studied, where a variety of 
purely personal motivations can be defined in terms of the col-
lective, thereby enhancing group-helping behavior. It seems 
more likely, however, that when labor activists join with a 
group whose stated purpose is zoning, at times enough energy 
might be generated for victory (zoning is, after all, still con-
nected to the group’s broader labor sentiments because it can 
exclude Wal-Mart), the strength and stability of the collective is 
ultimately weakened by the precariousness of the alliance. For 
if the key to melding disparate energies for collective gain is 
the group’s ability to tie those energies to something commu-
nal, the causes of “No to Wal-Mart!” or “Workers’ Rights!” seem 
like better candidates than any particular zoning ordinance or 
referendum. The site fight’s technical and idiosyncratic nature 
unhelpfully sidetracks and attenuates the commonalities be-
tween activists’ personal motivations in a way that may be 
strategically, but not civically, logical.  
Indeed, the more challenging the task of relating a group’s 
scattered, diverse personal interests to the communal goal in 
question, the harder it may be to maintain the organization. 
Where the stated group aim is detached from on-the-ground 
passions, civic activism may degrade into “impulsive protest”160 
with participants concerned more with “cultural expressive-
ness”161 than true alliance. A culturally salient entity like Wal-
Mart might then draw many to a site fight because it seems 
like the trendy thing to do.162 Some would rightly question the 
 
 158. Id. at 4–5. 
 159. Id. at 13–14 (citing ROBERT BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART 133 
(1985)). 
 160. LICHTERMAN, supra note 155, at 13. 
 161. WOLIN, supra note 136, at 584.  
 162. See generally MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT 7 (2004) (trac-
ing the phenomena of social epidemics, which draw people to products, mes-
sages, and movements). 
FISKOSWALT_4FMT 5/24/2008 11:37 AM 
1532 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:1502 
 
genuineness and sustainability of a democratic activism 
founded on fad.163  
Moreover, from Wal-Mart’s perspective, that the site fight 
reorients grassroots challenges from labor issues to more tech-
nical and less intuitive land-use issues is probably desirable. 
Wal-Mart’s image largely depends not on the aesthetics of its 
stores but on the public’s affirmation that the benefits of low 
prices trump the detriments of low wages.164 The less the com-
pany is forced to defend its labor practices directly, or to focus 
on the harms it causes to the local economy, the better.165  
In reality, the contours of the anti-Wal-Mart argument 
have been a part of the American political debate for decades; 
progressives have long fought for policies that promoted mass 
purchasing power.166 What is new, however, is the shift in how 
the argument is framed and operates, from labor to land. In 
consequence, Wal-Mart, a soft target for moral-economic criti-
ques as an unrivaled labor and employment villain in a swel-
ling sea of populist sentiment,167 remains insulated from such 
potent attacks as the site fight intrudes, reorients, and ob-
scures the high-wage, low-price cause.  
Of course, on its own Wal-Mart is no stranger to the art of 
rhetorical deflection, embedding serious debate over its harsh 
labor policies within homemade, folksy euphemisms.168 At-will, 
part-time, low-wage clerks are company “associates” who face 
not discipline but “coach[ing],” not from the foreman or from 
Human Resources, but from the “people division.”169 At the 
 
 163. See LICHTERMAN, supra note 155, at 14 (“How could others depend on 
someone who tied political commitments to personal preference instead of a 
sense of obligation?”); cf. WOLIN, supra note 136, at 603 (“[Democracy] should 
be conceived of as a moment of experience, a crystallized response to deeply 
felt grievances or needs . . . . Its moment is not just a measure of fleeting time 
but an action that protests actualities and reveals possibilities.”). 
 164. See, e.g., Wal-Mart President & CEO Lee Scott, Advertisement, Wal-
Mart’s Impact on Society: A Key Moment in Time for American Capitalism, 
N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 7, 2005, at 6. 
 165. See id. 
 166. MEG JACOBS, POCKETBOOK POLITICS 5–7 (2005); Lichtenstein, supra 
note 27, at 26. 
 167. See Robin Toner, A New Populism Spurs Democrats on the Economy, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2007, at A1 (“[T]he latest populist resurgence is deeply 
rooted in a view that current economic conditions are difficult and deteriorat-
ing for many people.”). 
 168. See Lichtenstein, supra note 27, at 17 (“Walton strove mightily, and 
often successfully, to project Wal-Mart as the embodiment of a more virtuous 
and earthy enterprise.”). 
 169. Id. 
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company’s annual meeting, top executives perform vaudeville-
like skits and songs that self-mock and embarrass.170 Professor 
Nelson Lichtenstein has remarked on the “carnivalesque” qual-
ity of this culture, which allows Wal-Mart to portray itself as a 
Main Street merchant with small-town values while pursuing 
ruthless labor policies that give it the efficiencies of a huge cor-
poration.171 We argue that site fights themselves take on simi-
larly carnivalesque qualities when they explicitly oppose Wal-
Mart yet implicitly abet the company’s avoidance of allegations 
of employee abuse by shifting debate to an alternative (and ar-
guably safer) terrain. 
That is unfortunate. As historian Michael Kazin has sug-
gested, progressivism’s strength has traditionally depended 
upon a people united less by the prices and characteristics of 
“what they wish to consume” and more by their willingness to 
empathize with producers and project their grievances.172 In 
the 1930s, for example, an ideological alignment between 
workers and consumers “transformed their agenda of mass 
purchasing power into a program of national recovery.”173 But 
where repeated challenges to the nation’s largest and most re-
gressive employer abstract core producer grievances into some-
thing else, progressivism’s potential for renewal dissipates. 
Consequently, alongside the fear that “management of the 
common good is being ceded” to corporate powers174 stands 
another fear: that, in the United States, management of pro-
gressivism is being ceded to the powers of preemption.  
IV.  CIVIC DEMOCRACY AS A LEGAL ARGUMENT 
AGAINST PREEMPTION   
In Part II.A above, we described a legal argument that 
ERISA does not preempt fair-share laws. Here, we move 
beyond that conventional form of technical argument about the 
scope of preemption to offer a novel, fundamental, and norma-
tive argument against broad preemption. The legal debate over 
the scope of federal preemption of state laws usually focuses on 
two competing constellations of values. On the one hand, the 
benefits of national uniformity are said to favor preemption. 
 
 170. See id. at 17–18. 
 171. See id.; see also Mark Gimein, Sam Walton Made Us a Promise, FOR-
TUNE, Mar. 18, 2002, at 120, 121–22. 
 172. See KAZIN, supra note 2, at 286. 
 173. JACOBS, supra note 166, at 9. 
 174. WOLIN, supra note 136, at 578. 
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This was the policy argument that carried the day in the 
Fourth Circuit’s analysis of the Maryland fair-share case.175 On 
the other, the benefits of local experimentation and local con-
trol are said to argue against preemption.176 As applied to local 
efforts to regulate low wages and poor health benefits, the ar-
gument is almost always phrased as pitting the benefits to Wal-
Mart of enabling it to have one uniform benefit plan, one uni-
form wage scheme, and even one uniform human relations poli-
cy, against the benefits of allowing local governments to expe-
riment with solutions to the health care crisis.177 
This phrasing of the competing arguments underlying 
preemption law misses two crucial values. First, states retain 
regulatory power in many areas. Federal preemption does not 
liberate a nationwide business from complying with local law; it 
simply limits the types of local laws that apply. Although the 
Fourth Circuit majority found ERISA to preempt Maryland law 
because it discerned in the statute a policy against requiring 
employers to “navigat[e] the narrow regulatory channel be-
tween” state law and ERISA’s regulatory scheme,178 that navi-
gation is necessary for any nationwide business. Wal-Mart still 
must confront local land-use law, local variations in taxes, and 
local variations in employment laws. It must pay a higher min-
imum wage in the thirty states that have minimum wages 
higher than that of the FLSA.179 It cannot discriminate in em-
ployment on the basis of sexual orientation or political activity 
in California;180 but it is free to do so in most other states. It 
must comply with different states’ regulation of the business of 
insurance, as well as disability and unemployment insurance 
 
 175. See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 197 (4th Cir. 
2007). 
 176. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICIES 390–96 (3d ed. 2006) (describing the basic policy issues in 
preemption analysis). Some scholars defend preemption even with a strong 
commitment to federalism. E.g., Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemp-
tion, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2087 (2000); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 
225, 230–32 (2000). 
 177. See Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 848; Edward A. Zelinsky, The New Mas-
sachusetts Health Law: Preemption and Experimentation, 49 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 229, 280–81 (2007) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Massachusetts]; Sharon Reece, 
ERISA Preemption and Fair-Share Legislation, 4–6, Aug. 9, 2007, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1006026.  
 178. Fielder, 475 F.3d at 197. 
 179. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, MINIMUM WAGE LAWS IN THE STATES (Jan. 
1, 2008), available at http://www.dol.gov/esa/minwage/America.htm. 
 180. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1101–02 (West 2007).  
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laws and mandatory leave policies. All of these require an em-
ployer to consider health benefit plan design. It must adhere to 
different tax withholding schemes. It pays different forms of 
sales tax, property tax, and other taxes. The most that ERISA 
preemption can do is to channel the fight against Wal-Mart’s 
labor practices into areas where local law remains enforceable 
(such as land use, taxes, and wages) and away from areas 
where local law cannot operate (direct regulation of health ben-
efits and unionization). It does not free Wal-Mart from local le-
gal efforts aimed at changing its practices.  
Second, to the extent that preemption does not channel but 
instead chokes off avenues of legal challenge, preemption stifles 
local political organizing around issues such as affordable 
health care and living wages. When labor activists, community 
organizers, people of faith concerned about poverty, and health 
care activists are told by their lawyers that organizing is futile 
because federal law denies their local government the power to 
enact law to address key issues, it is as if the government is 
telling people that democracy is not for them. Preemption, in 
effect, functions as a form of repression. It tells citizens that it 
is pointless to organize politically at the local level and engage 
in democratic action to create a better society because all power 
is held by a seemingly remote federal authority. Indeed, local 
activists are keenly aware that they lack the economic and po-
litical power to persuade a majority of the House and Senate to 
enact comprehensive legislation on wages and health care. 
Surely, a federal court ought to think very carefully before it 
reads an ambiguous, hastily considered, and poorly drafted 
provision like the ERISA preemption clause as a directive to si-
lence local organizing around the issue of health care. 
There is currently a debate among legal scholars about 
whether broad preemption of state law is beyond the scope of 
Congress’s constitutional powers.181 During debates over New 
Deal and Great Society social programs, and fights over civil 
rights legislation, progressives often argued in favor of broad 
federal legislative power and broad preemption of regressive 
state laws, and conservative defenders of business prerogatives 
often defended a robust vision of states’ rights and limits on 
federal legislative action.182 Today the roles are often reversed, 
 
 181. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 176, at 390–96; Dinh, supra note 176, 
at 2087; Nelson, supra note 176, at 228–31. 
 182. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social 
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
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with progressives arguing for the right of states to regulate and 
conservatives arguing for federal preemption of state law. 
When the debate focuses on the power of Congress to preempt 
state law, progressives now sometimes argue for the presump-
tion against preemption that conservatives used to favor, and 
vice versa.183  
Our analysis has implications for this debate but does not 
require one to reject the power of Congress to preempt state 
law. In our view, Congress could enact a statute preempting all 
state and local laws on the subject of health care, but Congress 
has not done so in ERISA. ERISA was enacted to deal with a 
specific problem of the 1960s and 1970s—widespread pension 
plan defaults—and was premised on the assumption that 
health benefits plans were financially and socially insignificant 
in comparison to pension plans.184 Thus, ERISA extensively re-
gulates pension plans to protect employees but says almost 
nothing on the content of health plans.185 Broad preemption of 
state regulation of pension plans makes sense in light of the ex-
tensive federal regulation; preemption of health benefits was 
almost an afterthought. There is no reason to read, more broad-
ly than is necessary to effectuate congressional intent, the “re-
lates to” language of section 514 as reflecting a deliberate con-
gressional judgment to completely disempower states and local 
governments from addressing health care costs and availabili-
ty. That is to say, while Congress clearly made a decision to 
protect employer-provided benefits plans from some state regu-
lation, it is not clear how much regulation was to be displaced. 
It is only by abstracting several degrees from what Congress 
actually considered in 1974 that we can conclude that Congress 
intended to prevent state and local experimentation with 
measures to solve the contemporary crisis in health care 
finance. Courts should not conclude that a statute meant to ad-
dress the problem of pension plan defaults should silence one of 
the great political debates of our era: the debate over the value 
of labor in the low-wage retail sector. 
In short, given the drastic political and social consequences 
of preemption, courts ought not read the preemption provision 
 
2062, 2115–16 (2002). 
 183. Cf. Nelson, supra note 176, at 229 (“In recent years . . . liberal advo-
cates of government regulation have joined in arguing that current tests for 
preemption risk displacing too much state law.”). 
 184. Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000) (focusing on pension plans in declaration 
of policy). 
 185. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461.  
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broadly in an area where Congress chose not to regulate. Since 
in ERISA Congress chose not to regulate health benefits, and 
particularly the unavailability of health care to low-wage work-
ers, courts ought not conclude that Congress’s failure to regu-
late operates to displace state and local laws in this area of in-
tense local concern.  
The question for courts confronting preemption challenges 
is to decide whether the structure and purpose of ERISA and 
federal health care policy are consistent with these sorts of 
state and local innovations. As we have shown, neither the lan-
guage of ERISA nor the governing Supreme Court precedent 
compel preemption of state and local fair-share laws. At the 
level of policy, therefore, courts confront a choice. Is ERISA 
preemption of fair-share legislation consistent with ERISA pol-
icy or not? To answer this question, courts should move beyond 
the usual preemption policy arguments about the benefits of 
national uniformity and the desirability of local experimenta-
tion in the area of health care finance reform. Courts can more 
profitably focus on whether state and local communities, and 
the governments that respond to their pressure, should be em-
powered to address through legislation what they conceive as 
social problems. 
An argument often made in favor of ERISA preemption of 
state and local fair-share laws is that such laws are bad policy 
because they will drive up prices and thus hurt the very group 
of people they are intended to help: those earning low wages.186 
Others dispute this.187 The effect of wage regulation and health 
care finance regulation on prices, on levels of employment, and 
on aggregate wealth among low-income groups is obviously an 
empirical question. It is a question on which economists dif-
fer.188 Given that reasonable minds differ, the important ques-
tion is who should decide. Preemption of state and local laws 
means that Congress alone decides, and that it will decide 
without empirical testing of the competing economic models 
about the effect of excluding Wal-Mart from local economies on 
prices, employment, and wealth. Moreover, even if state and lo-
cal fair-share laws do increase prices, reduce employment, and 
 
 186. See, e.g., Zelinsky, Massachusetts, supra note 177, at 849. 
 187. See, e.g., DUBE & JACOBS, supra note 17, at 8. 
 188. Some of those opinions are canvassed in the articles in this sympo-
sium. See, e.g., David Neumark & William Wascher, Minimum Wages and 
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REV. 1296 passim (2008). 
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cause a net aggregate loss of wealth for low-wage workers, that 
is not a reason for federal law to preempt such law. In a democ-
racy, the local community should be empowered to decide 
whether they want Wal-Mart-style jobs and Wal-Mart-style 
shopping.189  
  CONCLUSION   
Across towns, cities, and states, thousands of people organ-
ize against Wal-Mart. For these groups, Wal-Mart is an engine 
driving today’s wage and health care inequalities to an historic 
high. How federal law treats their grassroots efforts is central 
to the future of the ongoing debate about whether communities 
are better off with or without Wal-Mart’s low prices, bad jobs, 
and adverse effects on the local retail sector.  
Preemption doctrine has served both to derail the debate 
about Wal-Mart, by invalidating the Maryland fair-share 
health care reform act that was the result of years of grassroots 
organizing in Maryland, and to deform it by forcing a debate 
over working conditions and health care into a debate over land 
use. But the law of preemption does not compel this result. The 
anti-Wal-Mart fervor is bottom-up and neighbor to neighbor. 
The organizing it prompts is eminently democratic. Instead of 
derailing and deforming democracy, courts should rein in 
preemption, stand aside, and let the spirit of civic democracy—
perhaps the very future of progressivism—shine through.  
 
 
 189. For a description of the significance of Wal-Mart as a target for local 
activism around wages and working conditions in retail sales, see Orly Lobel, 
Big-Box Benefits: The Targeting of Giants in a National Campaign to Raise 
Work Conditions, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1685, 1688–94 (2007). 
